November 19, 2026
Interviews
Patronage Politics
Parties and civic organization in the US midterms
The Democratic Party’s sweeping victory in the 2026 midterm elections has redrawn a frozen political map and cracked open stunning possibilities for the future of American politics. In a midterm in which more money was spent to influence votes than any other in American history, a groundswell of revulsion against the cost of living and the second Trump administration met energized campaign apparatuses and large-scale organizing infrastructure.
Spending is estimated at nearly $12 billion, up from about $4 billion in 2016; Elon Musk alone donated $445 million to Republican campaigns. Meanwhile, new mobilizing networks drove a near record in voter turnout, including in states like Mississippi where nearly half a million voters elected Scott Colom—the first black Senator since Reconstruction.
Union mobilization, too, was exceptional. The AFL-CIO ran a historic midterm program across thirty-five states, while Michigan’s UAW made an impressive push for Senate candidate Abdul El-Sayed, knocking fifteen thousand doors and making more than 145,000 calls for his primary bid. Union votes made up 16 percent of those cast, up by five points from 2024.
As the full scale and impact of the election results continues to come into view, PW editor Maya Adereth spoke to renowned historical sociologist Theda Skocpol about the political trajectory that led to this moment. Skocpol’s many influential books investigate the relationship between states and social movements, in contexts ranging from the French, Russian, and Chinese revolutions to the United States’ peculiar welfare state. Her most recent books examine the profound transformations in American civic life since the early twentieth century, documenting the declining organizational power of trade unions and communal associations alongside the consolidation of Tea Party power in the Republican Party. Below, Skocpol discusses these shifts—emphasizing the historical links between America’s wars, its political party structure, and its organizational fabric.
An Interview with Theda Skocpol
Maya Adereth: Let’s begin with the midterms. How should we understand the Democrats’ resounding victory, and what are the long-term implications for US politics?
Theda Skocpol: The midterm results are a landmark in US political history. The wave of victories for Democratic candidates paves the way for a repudiation of the Trumpian synthesis of plutocratic patrimonial corruption and MAGA racism. No partisan operation or pundit anticipated the full sweep, depth, and size of the victory. Candidates everywhere, at all levels of government won by seven to fourteen or more points. As a result, congressional control will change by huge margins. The Democrats now hold 56 seats in the Senate and are set to hold nearly 260 seats in the House. Changes at the state level are perhaps even more important, with Democrats now holding thirty governorships, and in full control of many swing state legislatures, while GOP supermajorities have been broken in key red states.
Democratic candidates came from enormously diverse backgrounds, and exhibited a range of political perspectives, but they were broadly unified around a message that prioritized popular concerns with rising living costs, a stupid war, destructive immigration raids, and elite corruption. Despite political operatives’ claim to the contrary, rather than highlighting a single generalizable model of victory, the cycle demonstrated the importance of running candidates that can genuinely speak to their states and districts, and who actively engaged with voters everywhere.
Will the Democrats now rise to the occasion of building on this wave through successive national elections? In Congress, instead of passing huge kitchen sink bills no one understands, they should focus on passing popular measures one at a time, forcing Trump to veto them. They must also maximize state government powers to secure visible wins for the electorate that can’t be won via Congress, and seize the moment to invest resources into organizing across the South, particularly mobilizing black voters’ outrage over attacks on voting rights.
Perhaps most crucially, Democrats must profoundly rethink their organizing strategy. They ought to fire most of the high-priced consultants who recommended spending on television ads just before elections, and instead invest in sustained all-year organizing. Parties should not just appear before elections, they should be present in people’s day-to-day lives and attuned to their needs. This will help Democrats keep the messaging straightforward and clear. It will also give them credibility when they excoriate Trump and remaining GOP officeholders who try to block changes. American democracy has arrived at a very hopeful but still fraught juncture.
MA: War was an incredibly important theme across Democratic campaigns. As news of the GOP bloodbath emerged, Vice President JD Vance sought to distance himself from his party’s failure, identifying the US–Israeli war on Iran as a central cause of Republican losses. You have written much about the role of war in the making of American society. How has war shaped the character of the US state?
TS: Charles Tilly famously taught us that war makes the state, and the state makes war. In the case of the US, it was the Civil War that made the American state. The US’s largest war was a war about itself, and in some ways it is a war that never ended.
One notable feature of traditional US war-making was that the US government had no standing army. It was born out of an anti-monarchical tradition, which meant that the army was raised initially by volunteers. During the Civil War, most members of the small officer corps that had been trained in West Point “went South”—that is, they fought for the Confederacy. Volunteer officers and soldiers came from state guard and newly formed units and entered the army in groups organized by towns. These regional formations were amalgamated together to form the Union Army. Even later, when a draft was instituted, it relied on this federated structure.
The early voluntarist and federalist nature of the US Army very much shaped its state institutions in the long run. The central tendency in the US political system is to assemble national coalitions through associations organized at the local and state levels. This federated structure has been important because it has meant that organized class formations were not the foremost actors in American politics. Instead, federalism privileged locally organized interest groups that were often cross-class in nature: political parties, women’s groups, and veterans’ associations being key examples.
Eventually, this organizational form brought working-class activists into contact with elite reformers who were able to champion their cause across diverse regional geographies. Because they were concentrated in industrializing cities, class-based organizations had a difficult time organizing consistently across the vast geographical and institutional landscape of the country.
When we look at the early American welfare state, then, what we see is that it is lacking in the sort of class-based provisions that emerged in other early industrializing states, where class-centered parliamentary parties set the agendas. But the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century US state did have a very generous pension system for Union veterans and their relatives, to which it added state-level mothers’ pensions, which in many cases preceded the women’s suffrage movement. These were profoundly redistributive programs; they cut across regions, from the South to the North, Midwest, and the West, as well as the urban–rural divide, extending to many (but not all) working and farm families. Civil War Union pensions became more generous than the old-age pensions of many European welfare states. Ultimately, there was targeted redistribution towards veterans, mothers, and the elderly—but not to the working class as a whole.
This structure for public benefits was also crucial in shaping the nature of US political parties, which similarly emerged from assembling organized local groups across different regions. Originally, US electoral parties were patronage operations that handed out public jobs and benefits to constituents, not movement parties. You might expect war-making to centralize this sort of aggregated organizational structure. But across my research, I have found that the Civil War, World War I, and even World War II, to some degree, all counterintuitively strengthened these voluntaristic associations, which ran in parallel to the federated structure of US parties and government.
The three-tiered structure—local, state, federal—has been central to American civic life for more than 150 years. It has been adopted by groups who are too small to even have three tiers. For example, my husband’s Czech ancestors arrived in the US in the 1850s. The Czech population that spread across various parts of the country remained relatively small, so one might expect it to remain local in character. Nevertheless, their mutual benefit society adopted lodges at the local, state, and federal level. In this situation, practically everyone had to be an officer at some point. Black fraternal orders originally experimented with a city-centered district model, which made more demographic sense, but most of these associations ultimately embraced the three-tiered federalist structure as well.
MA: You mentioned that political parties in the US differ from movement-based parties. Could you talk more about the transformations in US party politics over the course of the twentieth century?
TS: Ira Katznelson and Martin Schefter have shown that class-based politics worked well in parliamentary systems that gradually integrated working-class people through trade-union linked political parties. That is not the American story. US parties are patronage parties, meaning that the purpose behind capturing federal power has been to hand out goods: post offices, access to services, pensions, and so on.
That means that much of what US political parties historically did was not really electoral—their activity was more commonly aimed at serving their own constituents, by giving them access to things others wouldn’t have access to. The effort to maintain this support from one’s constituents—and at the expense of passing legislation for the country as a whole—has meant that parties ended up developing a patchy infrastructure of patronage-driven services.
Let’s take one example. After a brief period during Reconstruction, Black Americans were brutally forced out of the electoral system in many parts of the country. But Black associations continued to be active within the Republican Party. Why? It was through fraternal lodges and civic groups that the Republican Party channeled resources to disenfranchised Black Americans. In Southern states, Black Americans were given jobs as postmasters and customs collectors; some were appointed as diplomats. Black leaders were able to maintain a say in who was appointed within the Party until the early 1900s.
The 1930s was a transformational period. The Great Migration saw a realignment of Black Americans to the North and class politics began to emerge with the rise of industrial unionism in the northern states. Further changes occurred in the 1960s, when Black people gained full voting rights, but membership-based voluntary associations gave way to professionally led interest groups of many kinds. Over the past half century, such interest groups have come to line up behind one or the other of the two major parties, even as industrial unions have gone into decline, again leaving US party politics without much of a class basis.
Today, people often argue that the two parties have been hollowed out. They are increasingly seen as electoral machines with very little basis in associational life, except for the continuing sway of Christian churchgoing conservatives in the Republican coalition. The Democratic Party does still have organized groups, but its broadest organized sector from the New Deal era was based in blue-collar industrial unions, which have virtually collapsed by now. Organized constituencies around the Democratic Party are now largely led by professional interest groups.
In the Trump era, the Republican Party has transformed from a model of party patronage to one of personal patronage. Four years from now, Donald Trump may be out of office, or dead, but his sons will continue to be billionaires, profiting from the defense contracts they are getting today. The US’s entire corporate sector is banking on getting direct links to the White House that will allow them to manipulate government contracts and regulations. That is fundamentally different from the way US party politics operated from the 1930s to the 1960s, where organized labor and business organizations tended to have strong sway in their respective parties. This was never fully-blown class politics, but it was the closest the United States came to it.
MA: You have linked the declining vitality of American associational life to many of the political problems we face today—including the apparent hollowing out of political parties, but also the rise of the far right, which first emerged in the form of the Tea Party. What has happened to American associationalism, and what have been its political implications?
TS: How should we analyze social transformations? Well, we can look at attitude polls and election counts, as many political scientists do, or we can look at “social movements,” as many sociologists do. From my perspective, organizational configurations are the key to understanding wider social shifts. And we have seen very significant transformations in the organizational structure of US society since the second half of the twentieth century.
To summarize, from the Civil War to the 1960s, both political parties were rooted in civic associations that were cross-class and that cut across regions in a federated structure. This infrastructure is what held together both top-down and bottom-up forces in US politics, and it was more effective at channeling cultural themes than class-based themes, but parts of parties also catered to regional economic interests.
That structure has now come apart in different ways on the left and the right. On the left, we have seen a total collapse of organizational infrastructure since the 1960s. My colleague Marshall Ganz says we have a lot of headless bodies and bodiless heads. Instead of dense civic networks rooted in the trade union movement, women’s groups, and the Black liberation movement, as used to be the case, the political structure is now dominated by an educated class organized into professionally run, donor-operated advocacy operations with offices in Washington, claiming to speak for constituencies they never interact with. We have a class of political consultants designing TV ad campaigns and using surveys to formulate party programs.
But conducting surveys is very different from having to hold together an association of dues-paying members, which involves paying very close attention to what members are thinking and how they live and work. Surveys just give you a few key words that you can throw into a campaign message. And that sort of politics ultimately runs its course. It seems thin and manipulated to most people. True democratic politics requires ongoing engagement to build loyal constituencies.
At their height, the blue-collar trade unions had those local roots. They lost them as part of the coordinated political attack against them, but also because of their own choices. They chose to invest their dwindling resources in Washington lobbying rather than sustaining their civic infrastructure. And that was important because politics is ultimately about relationships. If you lose your relationships, you have lost your role in people’s day-to-day lives. In our book, Rust Belt Union Blues, Lainey Newman and I emphasized the communal function of trade unions. Once people have lost those kinds of community ties, they will find them in gun clubs and megachurches instead. That’s what happened in the Rust Belt, and now those venues are connected to MAGA Republicans.
The Democrats’ decision from the 1960s to start relying on litigation in the courts was another sign of their shift away from the grass roots. This has completely backfired because courts can be remade—as they have been by the right—and legalism is a political outlook that grows isolated from the public’s understanding of politics. After the 1960s, the Democrats became overly reliant on the idea that congressional staff and lawyers in the courts could shape public policies. Republican gains after the 1980s, and then ultimately the radicalization of the Republican Party by the Koch network, Tea Party protestors, and the rise of Donald Trump showed how hollow and reversible earlier Democratic gains could be. The Trump era in many ways has forced Democrats to confront the loss of their popular roots.
On the right, there have been two parallel developments radicalizing the Republican Party since the early 2000s: the top-down Koch brothers network, and the bottom-up Tea Party network. This coalition of grassroots and elite interests did not agree on the core issues (such as immigration) but they have made use of one another’s resources and clout. Money from above, and mass participation from below, have transformed the Republican Party into a radical anti-government and anti-democratic force, opening the door for Trump to grab control for his own gain and that of his close allies.
My research with Vanessa Williamson on the Tea Party found that one of its most astonishing features was just how widespread its presence was in its heyday, from 2009 to 2014. Virtually every congressional district had a Tea Party group formed and led by volunteers, and these groups were far more dense in already conservative Republican voting areas. Our fieldwork involved attending face-to-face meetings of the Tea Party, which were primarily attended by middle-income small property owners or workers in sectors like construction.
The meetings would start with a familiar choreography, the Pledge of Allegiance and a prayer, but they were not organized in the traditional local-state-federal way. These grassroots Tea Party chapters, some of which were secular, others of which overlapped with the Christian right through church networks, were primarily concerned with reversing immigration and gains in Black political power. For grassroots Tea Parties, Obama was terrifying and mobilizing.
Importantly, local Tea Party groups were not controlled by the Koch brothers. The Koch brothers were busy establishing Americans for Prosperity and accumulating resources from many millionaires and billionaires into their affiliated super PAC. The Kochs were a Leninist operation aiming to force the Republican Party into opposing government spending and regulations of any sort. Their organizations claimed to speak for the popular Tea Parties, but actually just used them as foot soldiers against Democrats.
Ultimately, the anti-immigrant, more popularly rooted Tea Party elements were able to take the political lead. Some Koch network figures transitioned into working for the main Tea Party apparatus—Corey Lewandowski being one good example. But the important point is that, in reorienting the Republican Party such that it captured the Tea Party vote, conservatives in the early 2000s paved the way for MAGA, once Donald Trump emerged to give popular nativism a central focal point.
Once installed in the White House, Trump was able to synthesize the Koch and Tea Party elements thanks to his style of personal patronage, but this coalition soon revealed itself to be very fragile, as Trump purged anyone unwilling to play along with the twists and turns of his tenure. The influence of private business interests over American politics is not new, but today these interests do not even operate in line with a broader political or economic program. Rather than prioritizing the workings of American Capitalism, its elite class now pursues short term individual gains. In the absence of a program, neither stability nor longevity can be maintained. And as the midterm results indicate, Trump himself may not be able to hold it together for much longer.
So we’re in a period where both parties are fundamentally transforming. There is a breaking apart of the top and bottom of both parties. To some degree, the Democrats are poorly positioned to meet this moment, because of their lack of an organized social base. But from another angle, we see a lot of experimentation from the Democrats, both from young progressive entrants into the party and from older members who are realizing that you cannot govern the country from New York and California only. There is a revival of old strategies in new forms.
What are some immediate implications of both the House and the Senate leaving GOP control? One is the courts: Trump was on track to continue the broader Republican project to assert top-to-bottom far-right control of the judiciary. A central line of attack against US multiracial democracy will now face headwinds and even the potential of some countermovement.
Will we see the return of some sort of redistributive agenda in the United States? It may well be possible as a reaction against the flaunting of political power and wealth at the top. If popular desire for redistribution can bring that agenda to life, the question, then, will be how it can be sustained, which is a question of organizational politics: how can parties and grassroots organizations claim a role for themselves in contemporary configurations of power? Democrats must both remake themselves and win repeated elections to reform institutions and policies in majoritarian directions. They must win not only in 2026, but also in 2028 and 2030, both nationally and across the states, constantly securing and developing political credibility with people all over the country.
A few well-timed words bandied by consultants won’t do it. So when political organizers and candidates ask me what to do, I offer simple and direct advice: find out where people in your constituency hang out, make sure you’ve got your people engaged and talking with everyone around them, and do it all the time—not just during election season. And, when you do win an election, make sure you visibly do all you can to deliver on some of the practical priorities—which are bound to differ in different parts of the country. All of this work matters a lot more than factional fights. Forget the labels and assemble broad coalitions to deal with real-world problems. Speak the language of everyday people and forget the academic neologisms. It is not all that hard, but will Democrats do it? I don’t know.
Further Reading
Rekindling Labor?
An interview with Kim Voss on the American labor movement, from the Knights of Labor to “Striketober.”
The uptick in organized and unorganized labor militancy registered throughout the pandemic, and in particular in strike and unionization campaigns in recent months, comes at...
Experiments in American Unions
An interview with Ben Fong
What is the future of labor organizing under Trump? Despite the apparent upsurge in labor militancy in recent years, the share of the US workforce...
Tax Regimes
An interview with Robin Einhorn
Tax cuts and austerity have been a central feature of American politics in recent decades—just recently, the Build Back Better bill was blocked under the...