# Phenomenal World

## PATTERN MANAGE

### Re-thinking industrial policy

Deindustrialization is a global phenomenon taking place more rapidly in middle- income countries than in high-income ones. Despite the global decline of manufacturing employment, "industrial policy" is increasingly salient in research and policy debates. But deindustrialization poses significant challenges for industrial strategy—particularly as it relates to direct state investment in productive capacity.

In a new article, "Industrial Policy in the 21st Century," Ha-Joon Chang and Antonio Andreoni lay the groundwork for a new theory of industrial policy:

"Since the 18th century, the debate surrounding industrial policy has been one of the most important in the political economy of development. We discuss a number of issues which cannot be accommodated within the neoclassical framework and which are also often neglected by evolutionary and structuralist contributions—namely, commitment under uncertainty, learning in production, macroeconomic management, and conflict management. We also address three new challenges for industrial policy makers in a changing world: the global value chain, the increasing financialization of the world economy, and changes in the rules of the global economic system.

Despite differences across countries in terms of their stages and levels of industrialization, their macroeconomic regimes and their political economy settings, the three sets of neglected issues we focus on are and will remain of paramount importance. The need to address long-term grand challenges like climate change calls for massive and coordinated investments in energy systems, production practices and mobility. The achievement of these global transformations still depends on micro-level structural changes in productive organizations and government interventions in creating new worlds of production as well as managing industrial and social restructuring."

• "Industrial policy can no longer be about industry or manufacturing per se. As the world economy turns increasingly towards services, it is clear that we will need a conception of industrial policy that addresses the need to nurture and develop modern economic activities more broadly, including but not limited to manufacturing." Karl Aiginger and Dani Rodrik's introduction to the special issue of Industry, Competition, and Trade. Link. In the same issue, Nathan Lane presents a "New Empirics of Industrial Policy." Link.
• In Industrial and Corporate Change, Mario Pianta, Matteo Lucchese, and Leopoldo Nascia assess the post-crisis industrial policies of the European Union and examine the potential for more active public investment policies in the years to come. Link.
• John Waterbury's extensive comparison between the industrial strategies of Nasser and Sadat. Link. From 1993, Hajoon Chang on the importance of state intervention in the "political economy of industrial policy in South Korea." Link.

## APPROPRIATION FRICTION

### Swedish wage earner funds and their limitations

Beyond growing calls for welfare expansion and a more progressive tax system, recent policy debates have begun to consider alternative models of firm ownership. Last year, the UK Labour party published a report outlining a path towards a more diverse set of ownership arrangements, including worker cooperatives and municipally owned service providers. The party also articulated an intention to transition ownership of up to 10% of shares to workers in large firms. More recently, the Bernie Sanders campaign announced a proposal for the formation of inclusive ownership funds, whereby large corporations contribute a portion of their stocks to an employee controlled fund. This comes in addition to Elizabeth Warren’s Accountable Capitalism Act, which calls for increased workers representation on company boards.

These recent proposals are distinctly reminiscent of programs put forward throughout the twentieth century, the most famous of which is Sweden’s 1976 Meidner Plan. In his 1992 book, Princeton politics professor JONAS PONTUSSON analyzes the origins of the plan, and the barriers to its successful implementation. He compares the movement for wage earner funds with that of co-determination, suggesting that the failure of the former has to do with the politics of legislation:

"In unfavorable political circumstances, it made sense for organized business to avoid major political confrontation and instead use post-legislative bargaining to define co-determination. By contrast, the Meidner Plan and subsequent wage-earner funds proposals left very little room for post-legislative bargaining. In other words, the co-determination offensive was a legislative success for the same reason that the implementation of new legislation became a disappointment for labor.

Organized business spent about as much on its advertising and media campaign against wage earner funds in 1982 as the five parliamentary parties spent on the election campaign that same year. But couldn’t the labor movement have devoted more resources to acquiring the expertise needed to influence industrial policy? The final lesson seems to be that when industrial policy, and investment policy more generally, fails to address wage earner’s immediate concerns, they are bound to become less supportive of further efforts to democratize investment decisions."

Link to the book chapter, and link to an article in which Pontusson assesses the diluted version of the plan which was implemented in 1983.

• "The concept of a society which is built on moral values remains, in my view, too promising to be extinguished by inhuman market forces." The disintegration of the Swedish model, in Rudolf Meidner’s words: Link. See also this interview with Meidner from 1998. Link.
• In the largest study of its kind, Joseph Blasi, Douglas Kruse and Dan Weltmann explore the impact of employee stock ownership plans (ESOP) on firm performance, concluding that "Privately held ESOP companies were only half as likely as non-ESOP firms to go bankrupt or close, had significantly higher post-adoption annual employment and sales growth, and demonstrated higher sales per employee." Link.
• In 1987, political theorist Jon Elster argued that the plan’s failure was the result of a fundamental problem in its conception of justice, which would leave much of the real decision making capabilities in the hands of the union bureaucracy. Link.
• A report on Public-Common Partnerships, an "alternative institutional design that moves us beyond the overly simplistic binary of market/state." Link.

## REMEDY EXERCISE

### Legal frameworks for sovereign debt restructuring

Despite contributing towards a series of crises (from the third world debt crisis of the 80s to the Euro-crisis of 2010), sovereign debt is rising across low-, middle-, and high-income economies, leading to renewed discussions around the macroeconomic consequences of sovereign debt restructuring and default.

In addition to debates about the economic consequences of default, a large academic and policy literature explores the varying legal architectures of debt contracts. In a 2002 paper, LEE BUCHHEIT and G. MITU GULATI present a history of contractual provisions for sovereign bonds in the United States, focusing specifically on the absence of collective action clauses, which are mandated in the UK.

From the article:

"In most contracts, the parties know each other's identity beforehand, and they make a conscious decision to enter into a legal relationship. In a multi-creditor debt instrument, the borrower's identity is of course known by each investor, but what the investors don't know is the identity of each other. When the bond issuer runs into financial difficulties, the actions of any one bondholder can dramatically affect the interests of all the other lenders.

Bonds issued by both corporate and sovereign borrowers in the early nineteenth century rarely contained provisions that contemplated collective decisionmaking by the bondholders. Each bond was a freestanding debt instrument; its terms could not be changed without the consent of its holder, and, if not paid when due, each holder was free to pursue her individual remedies against the issuer. The instruments did not require a holder to consult with, much less to act in concert with, fellow bondholders before, during or after a default. Although this approach ensured that each bondholder's claim against the borrower could not be deranged without that bondholder's consent, it also had the consequence of forcing financially-distressed corporate borrowers into bankruptcy (which in those days meant liquidation). This was, is, and ever shall be the "holdout creditor problem" in a debt workout.

One hundred years on, the financial community is again confronted with a remarkably similar problem. A sovereign bond issuer of the early twenty-first century is in much the same spot as the distressed corporate or railroad bond issuer of the early twentieth century. The merits of including majority action clauses in sovereign bonds as a method of neutralizing the holdout creditor are being proposed in some circles today, just as they were in the 1920s and 1930s in the context of corporate bonds. It may be feasible to engage the equity powers of U.S. federal courts in the oversight of some sovereign bond workouts with the result that the bondholders can be homogenized into a single voting class, and any court-approved compromise of the action will bind all members of that class."

• "By noticeably intensifying distributional conflict over scarce public resources, sovereign debt crises tend to lay bare underlying power dynamics that, during normal times, are quietly at work beneath the surface." Jerome Roos's recently published book uncovers the global distributional politics underlying the financialization of sovereign debt. Link. See also Barry Eichengreen's 2003 comparative overview of debt restructuring proposals. Link.
• Two pieces by José Ángel Gurría on the recent history of Mexico's debt crises: from Coping with Capital Surges, a chapter on the historical trade-offs of foreign direct investment; and a 1995 paper on "The Mexican Debt Strategy" draws policy lessons from the crises of the '80s. Link, link.
• "The Greek debt restructuring of 2012 stands out in the history of sovereign defaults. It achieved very large debt relief—over 50 per cent of 2012 GDP—with minimal financial disruption, but it did so at a cost." From 2013, "An Autopsy" of Greek debt restructuring, by Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Christoph Trebesch, and Mitu Gulati. Link. And a 2014 paper by Miranda Xafa assesses the drawbacks to delaying the restructuring after mid-2011. Link.

## SELECTED MOBILITY

Higher education is widely understood to be a major driver of intergenerational mobility in the United States. Despite the clear (and growing) inequalities between and within colleges, it remains the case that higher education reduces the impact that parental class position has on a graduate's life outcomes.

In an intriguing paper, associate professor of economics at Harvard XIANG ZHOU scrutinizes the implied causal relationship between college completion and intergenerational mobility. Specifically, Zhou uses a novel weighting method "to directly examine whether and to what extent a college degree moderates the influence of parental income" outside of selection effects, seeking to distinguish between the "equalization" and "selection" hypotheses of higher ed's impact on intergenerational mobility.

From the paper:

"Three decades have passed since Hout’s (1988) discovery that intergenerational mobility is higher among college graduates than among people with lower levels of education. In light of this finding, many researchers have portrayed a college degree as 'the great equalizer' that levels the playing field, and hypothesized that an expansion in postsecondary education could promote mobility because more people would benefit from the high mobility experienced by college graduates. Yet this line of reasoning rests on the implicit assumption that the 'college premium' in intergenerational mobility reflects a genuine 'meritocratic' effect of postsecondary education, an assumption that has rarely, if ever, been rigorously tested.

In fact, to the extent that college graduates from low and moderate-income families are more selected on such individual attributes as ability and motivation than those from high-income families, the high mobility observed among bachelor’s degree holders may simply reflect varying degrees of selectivity of college graduates from different family backgrounds."

In sum, Zhou finds that the "selection" hypothesis carries more weight than the "equalization" hypothesis. One implication of this finding is that "simply expanding the pool of college graduates is unlikely to boost intergenerational income mobility in the US." Link to the paper.

• A 2011 paper by Michael Bastedo and Ozan Jaquette looks at the stratification dynamics affecting low-income students within higher ed. Link. A paper from the same year by Martha Bailey and Susan Dynarski surveys the state of inequality in postsecondary education. Link.
• An op-ed by E. Tammy Kim in the Times argues for higher-education as a public good. Link.
• Marshall Steinbaum and Julie Margetta Morgan's 2018 paper examines the student debt crisis in the broader context of labor market trends: "Reliance on the college earnings premium [as a measure of success] is that it focuses primarily on the individual benefit of educational attainment, implying that college is worthwhile as long as individuals are making more than they would have otherwise. But in the context of public investment in higher education, we need to know not only how individuals are faring but also how investments in higher education are affecting our workforce and the economy as a whole." Link.

## HOW RESEARCH AFFECTS POLICY

### Results from Brazil

How can evidence inform the decisions of policymakers? What value do policymakers ascribe to academic research? In January, we highlighted Yale's Evidence in Practice project, which emphasizes the divergence between policymakers' needs and researchers' goals. Other work describes the complexity of getting evidence into policy. A new study by JONAS HJORT, DIANA MOREIRA, GAUTAM RAO, and JUAN FRANCISCO SANTINI surprises because of the simplicity of its results—policymakers in Brazilian cities and towns are willing to pay for evidence, and willing to implement (a low-cost, letter-mailing) evidence-based policy. The lack of uptake may stem more from a lack of information than a lack of interest: "Our findings make clear that it is not the case, for example, that counterfactual policies' effectiveness is widely known 'on the ground,' nor that political leaders are uninterested in, unconvinced by, or unable to act on new research information."

From the abstract:

"In one experiment, we find that mayors and other municipal officials are willing to pay to learn the results of impact evaluations, and update their beliefs when informed of the findings. They value larger-sample studies more, while not distinguishing on average between studies conducted in rich and poor countries. In a second experiment, we find that informing mayors about research on a simple and effective policy (reminder letters for taxpayers) increases the probability that their municipality implements the policy by 10 percentage points. In sum, we provide direct evidence that providing research information to political leaders can lead to policy change. Information frictions may thus help explain failures to adopt effective policies."

• New work from Larry Orr et al addresses the question of how to take evidence from one place (or several places) and make it useful to another. "[We provide] the first empirical evidence of the ability to use multisite evaluations to predict impacts in individual localities—i.e., the ability of 'evidence‐based policy' to improve local policy." Link.
• Cited within the Hjort et al paper is research from Eva Vivalt and Aidan Coville on how policymakers update their prior beliefs when presented with new evidence. "We find evidence of 'variance neglect,' a bias similar to extension neglect in which confidence intervals are ignored. We also find evidence of asymmetric updating on good news relative to one’s prior beliefs. Together, these results mean that policymakers might be biased towards those interventions with a greater dispersion of results." Link.
• From David Evans at CGDev: "'The fact that giving people information does not, by itself, change how they act is one of the most firmly established in social science.' So stated a recent op-ed in the Washington Post. That’s not true. Here are ten examples where simply providing information changed behavior." Link. ht The Weekly faiV.
• For another iteration of the question of translating evidence into policy, see our February letter on randomized controlled trials. Link.

## PROGRESS UNCOUPLE

### Debating growth and the Green New Deal

In past newsletters, we have highlighted research and policy proposals relating to the Green New Deal and the literature surrounding "degrowth"—the idea that the growth imperative is at odds with human flourishing. In a recent exchange, economist Robert Pollin debates sociologists Juliet Schor and Andrew Jorgenson on the relative merits of "decoupling" and "degrowth." The former asserts that "economies can continue to grow while advancing a viable climate-stabilization project, as long as the growth process is decoupled from fossil-fuel consumption." The latter holds that public discussions over combating climate change must turn "from growthcentricity to needs- and people-centered policies."

The authors share a commitment to increased public investment, and both sides emphasize the distributional consequences of decarbonization. Their debate turns on, and illuminates larger conversations regarding the discursive frameworks and metrics we use to understand economic life. Schor and Jorgenson see reducing GDP in the global north as one element of a program to radically restructure the principles of society; Pollin understands these efforts to muddy the mandate for immediate climate action.

From Pollin:

"Let’s assume that global GDP contracts by 10 percent over the next two decades, following a degrowth scenario. That would entail a reduction of global GDP four times larger than what we experienced over the 2007–2009 financial crisis and Great Recession. In terms of CO2 emissions, the net effect of this 10 percent GDP contraction, considered on its own, would be to push emissions down by precisely 10 percent—that is, from 32 billion tons to 29 billion. So, the global economy would still not come close to bringing emissions down to 20 billion tons by 2040.

The overwhelming factor pushing emissions down will not be a contraction of overall GDP but massive growth in energy efficiency and clean renewable energy investments (which, for accounting purposes, will contribute toward increasing GDP) along with similarly dramatic cuts in fossil-fuel production and consumption (which will register as reducing GDP). In my view, addressing these matters in terms of their specifics is much more constructive than presenting broad generalities about the nature of economic growth, positive or negative."

• Pollin elaborates on this point in his follow-up statement with a case study of Japan: "Despite the fact that Japan has been close to a no-growth economy for twenty years, its CO2 emissions remain among the highest in the world, at 9.5 tons per capita." Link. Another recent article reviews and recaps the decoupling vs. degrowth exchanges. Link.
• Schor and Jorgenson’s follow-up challenges Pollin's conviction that decoupling is either possible or efficient: "After decades of promises from advocates of green growth that absolute decoupling will happen, the record is dismal. The simple point about growth is therefore that it makes the nearly impossibly high mountain that we need to climb even steeper. Why rule out an important source of emissions reductions before we’ve even started?" Link.
• Another iteration of the debate in a compilation of INET papers: Schröder et al argue that "if past performance is relevant for future outcomes, our results should put to bed the possibility of 'green growth.'" Michael Grubb takes a different tack: "Before declaring that history has set limits on what is possible, we need to be extremely careful. The future has already started, though its beginnings may be modest." Link.
• From Autonomy, a proposal for a shortened work week—a key element of several green degrowth arguments. Link.
• Mark Paul, Anders Fremstad, and JW Mason offer a brand new paper on US decarbonization. "In an economy facing persistent demand constraints and weak labor markets, public spending on decarbonization will raise wages and living standards." Link.

## MOBILE COGNITION

### The political history of economic statistics

Debates over the relevance of indicators like GDP for assessing the health of domestic economies are persistent and growing. Critics of such measures point to the failures of such measures to holistically capture societal wellbeing, and argue in favor of alternative metrics and the disaggregation of GDP data. These debates reflect the politics behind the economic knowledge that shapes popular understanding and policy debates alike.

In his 2001 book Statistics and the German State, historian Adam Tooze examined the history of statistical knowledge production in Germany, covering the period from the turn-of-the-century to the end of the Nazi regime, "driven by the desire to understand how this peculiar structure of economic knowledge came into existence… and the relationship between efforts to govern the economy and efforts to make the economy intelligible through systematic quantification."

From the book's conclusion:

"We need to broaden our analysis of the forces bearing on the development of modern economic knowledge. This book has sought to portray the construction of a modern system of economic statistics as a complex and contested process of social engineering. This certainly involved the mobilization of economists and policy-makers, but it also required the creation of a substantial technical infrastructure. The processing of data depended on the concerted mobilization of thousands of staff. In this sense the history of modern economic knowledge should be seen as an integral part of the history of the modern state apparatus and more generally of modern bureaucratic organizations… The development of new forms of economic knowledge can therefore be understood as part of the emergence of modern economic government and as a sensitive indicator of the relationship between state and civil society."

Link to the book preview, link to the book page on Tooze's website.

• For a more generalized account of the political history of statistical knowledge (inclusive of economic statistics), see the The Politics of Large Numbers by Alain Desrosières. Link. Another excellent item in the history of statistical knowledge: A History of the Modern Fact, on the advent and impact of double-entry bookkeeping. Link.
• In the Winter 2019 issue of the Journal of Economic Perspectives, Hugh Rockoff examines the political history of American economic statistics, and tracks the emergence and institutionalization of measures of "prices, national income and product, and unemployment." Link.
• Previously shared here, research by Aaron Benanev examines the institutional history linking the concept of "informality" and unemployment metrics developed by the International Labor Organization. Link to his paper.
• A recent paper by Andrea Mennicken and Wendy Nelson Espeland surveys the quantification literature. Link. And a (previously shared) panel discussion on the historiography of quantification. Link.

## Sketch for a Counter-Sky

### On central bank independence and the rise of shadow money

Debates over the political impacts of Central Bank Independence (CBI) reached their peak in the late 90s and early 2000s, due to rising inequality and the volatility of financial markets. Initiated with the 1977 Federal Reserve Act and Paul Volcker’s subsequent term as chairman of the Fed, CBI was, and remains, a means of isolating the more "mechanical" field of monetary policy from the fleeting interests of politicians. In order to preserve stability and credibility, independent central banks have made inflation targeting the center point of their agenda. Critics of CBI have argued that the distinction between economic science and political incentives are not as clear as they might seem; low levels of inflation may benefit creditors and investors, but they harm those whose income entirely depends on rising wages. While monetary policy has distributional and political consequences, its decision makers are insulated from public accountability.

Expanding the literature on the politics of CBI, BENJAMIN BRAUN and DANIELA GABOR examine its financial consequences. In a recently published paper, they argue that the anti-inflationary policies of central banks have catalyzed dependence on shadow money and shadow banking, key components of a broader trend towards financialization:

"In the late 1990s, the US Federal Reserve was confronted with a peculiar predicament. While the world was celebrating central bank independence as a mark of 'scientific' economic governance after the populist era of monetizing government bonds, the US Federal Reserve worried about projections that the US government would pay down all its debt by 2012. A world without US government debt, they worried, was a world filled with monetary dangers. Market participants would not have a safe, liquid asset to turn to in times of distress.

Rather than seeking to limit shadow money supply, the Fed actively encouraged its expansion, seeking market solutions to political problems. It lobbied Congress to ensure that holders of shadow money backed by private (securitized) collateral had the same legal rights to collateral as those holding shadow money issued against US government debt. The Fed also changed its lending practices, allowing banks to issue shadow money backed by private collateral to borrow from the Fed. These concrete steps contrast starkly with the picture of central banks watching passively from the margins, as financial institutions find new ways to monetize credit and circumvent rules."

• More contemporary iterations of the debate over CBI can be found in the comparison between a 2018 HKS working paper, which distinguishes between "political oversight" and "operational independence," and a 2014 Levy Institute working paper which argues there is no practical meaning of operational independence at all. Link and link.

• A primer on shadow banking, from Stijn Claessens and Lev Ratnovski at Vox EU. Link.

• A new article by Andreas Kerna, Bernhard Reinsbergc, and Matthias Rau-Göhring finds that the IMF’s targeted lending practices actively encouraged the proliferation of independent central banks in low income economies. Link.

• On CBI, inflationary targets, and the 2010 Eurocrisis, by Mark Copelovitch, Jeffry Frieden, and Stefanie Walter. Link.

## PROPONENT EXCHANGE

### Policy feedback loops and US old-age policy

Researchers of policy history have long deliberated over explanatory frameworks: institutionalist accounts tend to focus on inherited conditions and path dependency in political development, while others stress the importance of social movements in shaping policy. Among the more dynamic analytical frameworks for the study of welfare politics is that of "policy feedbacks," which looks at the evolution of policy as an iterative process in which new policies change the conditions for further political engagement.

In a 2019 article, EDWIN AMENTA and THOMAS ALAN ELLIOTT look at the utility of these frameworks for explaining the character of old-age pensions in the US from the mid-1930s to 1950s.

From the article:

"In 1935, Congress created Old Age Assistance (OAA), a federal-state matching program which immediately provided benefits to the elderly. All states adopted old-age assistance legislation by 1937, and many states passed generous pensions. These reforms occurred in the context of extensive activity by the old-age pension movement, which called for $200 monthly pensions to almost all nonemployed citizens over 60 years. This proposal was rejected, and the Social Security Act was enacted in August 1935. For the formative years of U.S. social policy, the elderly had to rely almost entirely on old age assistance programs, and these varied dramatically in generosity from state to state. We seek to explain why some states became generous and why some of them remained so during the formative years of U.S. old-age policy. The results provide some support for each of the models. Initial generosity was prompted in some states by way of insider institutional political processes. In others, the politically mediated influence of a social movement, including mediation through favorable public opinion, brought about generous pensions. In the second period, initial generosity was a key determinant of later generosity, but it also required group mobilization, as expected by the positive policy feedback model. Yet there was still a route for states that were not generous to become so, one that worked through the politically mediated effects of a social movement. This is good news for U.S. proponents of policy reform. Political institutional obstacles to democracy, including an underdemocratized polity and patronage-based parties, stood as major hindrances to progressive old-age policy in its formative years. These obstacles were reduced by the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and various reforms of political parties and nomination systems that work mainly through primaries." Link to the paper. • "Drawing on the example of conservative cross-state advocacy against public sector unions, I describe the strategy of policy feedback as political weapon. I document that the passage of conservative network-backed legislation led to large and enduring declines in public sector union density and revenue. I further show that by curbing the power of public unions, the passage of conservative network-backed bills dampened the political participation of public sector employees." Alexander Hertel-Fernandez on "Policy Feedback as Political Weapon." Link. (See also our recommended readings post from Hertel-Fernandez, and a related newsletter on RTW and policy feedbacks from back in 2018.) • A 2003 book by Andrea Louise Campbell considers how the passage of Social Security galvanized political participation among low-income seniors. Link. And, from 2014, Amy Lerman and Vesla Weaver examine how the criminal justice system does just the opposite for the formerly incarcerated. Link. • "I suggest that laws and administrative rules operate on voluntary organizations to structure the resources, capacities, strategies, and ideals of individuals." Kristin Goss develops a multi-level theory of feedback loops. Link. ### June 3rd, 2019 ## Convex Mirror ## GREEN PLAN(K) ### Growing the Green New Deal in the US and Europe Jay Inslee, the governor of Washington State and Democratic presidential candidate, has made climate policy the center of his longer-than-long-shot campaign. On May 3rd, he released 8 pages of goals, and on May 16th, he released the 35-page, 28-policy “Evergreen Economy Plan,” with several more similarly lengthy reports on the way. David Roberts, an energy commentator at Vox, had a representative reaction to Inslee’s policies: “Inslee’s campaign is systematically translating the Green New Deal’s lofty goals — to decarbonize the economy sector by sector, in a way that creates high-quality jobs and protects frontline communities — into policy proposals.” The report includes policies on infrastructure, manufacturing, R&D, and policies for energy workers, including a “GI Bill” and 8 million new jobs over the next 10 years. But beyond its extremely detailed recommendations, a key point of interest is seeing how the GND’s idealistic goals are cashed out. The introduction emphasizes a restorative approach: “Inherent throughout ... is the urgent need to support frontline, low-income, and Indigenous communities, and communities of color. These communities are being impacted first and worst by the accelerating damages of climate change, and have endured a legacy of air, water, toxics and climate pollution, along with a deficit of public investment and support. Through an assertive agenda of reinvestment that is guided by strong local input, Governor Inslee’s plan seizes the opportunity to build a clean energy economy that provides inclusive prosperity — upon a foundation of economic, environmental, racial and social justice.” Link to the report. • Leah Stokes, a climate and energy policy expert, contextualizes the expense on Twitter: “Spending$300 bn annually on climate is about 10% of the federal budget. Warren’s plan aggressively targets climate action by the military, which is about 20% of the federal budget. Hence, Inslee’s plan is about half the size of military spending. That’s BIG.” Link to the thread. - -
• Noah Smith also takes up the cost question: "It’s probably less than 20 percent of what Ocasio-Cortez’s plan would cost, and only a quarter of the total would be paid by the government, so new budget deficits or taxes would be relatively modest. And because Inslee’s plan is more narrowly focused on value-generating investments like infrastructure rather than new entitlement spending, a higher percentage of the cost would be recouped down the road." Link.
• As the GND gains momentum in the US, some in Europe are taking similar steps. DiEM25 (a pan-European organization co-founded in 2015 by Yanis Varoufakis) and the European Spring have released a report on a Green New Deal for Europe. Link. (Their candidates fell short in last week’s elections.)
• An article in the World Economic Forum on the Green New Deal for Europe explains some of the theoretical differences between the US and European plans. "Whereas the Americans are building on a century-old tradition of the original New Deal, we’re trying to marry that language with existing programs." Link.