World
The construction of a post-neoliberal order is underway. Given that there is no post-capitalist horizon under discussion, post-neoliberalism will not emerge in the same way that the US New Deal, the European Welfare State, or Latin American national developmentalism—whose agreements were built precisely on the “communist threat”—emerged out of the liberalism of the late nineteenth century. A hundred years ago, there were three possibilities for development: New Deal capitalism, fascist capitalism, and communism. As China is not comparable to what the Soviet Union once was—it is not an “exportable” model—what seems to be left for today’s still-democratic countries is a choice between emergent post-neoliberalisms of the Trumpist type and a liberal-progressive type that has not yet found a model to call its own.
The new election of Donald Trump has buried the progressive project of a “transition within order.” The Republican’s victory in 2024 suggested that the outliers were elections like Biden’s or Lula da Silva’s, and not the earlier success of Bolsonaro or Trump. Post-neoliberalism in its Trumpist version appears to be dominant. The progressive camp’s chance lies in building a real alternative opposition program in view of this trend: Avoiding widespread wars and achieving something of an energy transition is the pressing task of the next two decades at least.
As with the rise of liberalism and neoliberalism, the solidification of a post-neoliberal international order will not unfold homogeneously across the globe. Identifying the different dependency patterns among global South countries and their possible development trends requires finding an analytical orientation appropriate for comparative studies of political coalitions from different countries and regions.1 I propose the idea of the “neo-extractivist trap” as such an orientation.
The notion of a neoextractivist trap offers a particular interpretation of neoextractivism,2 to show how it might help us understand Brazil’s recent history—and maybe not only Brazil’s. The idea of a “neoextractivist trap” entails questioning formulations that have used the same notion of a “trap” for other purposes—particularly to delineate groups of countries belonging to the global South, such as the middle-income or low-growth traps. The neoextractivist trap, by contrast, asserts the centrality of dependency and the climate emergency in its understanding of the politics of economic development. It is analogous to the “low or middle-technology trap.”
My aim is to demonstrate the connection between neoliberalism and neoextractivism, in the last forty years of Brazilian history and in the contemporary global situation. Just like neoliberalism, neoextractivism should not be understood solely in economic terms, even under the broad notion of “economization” or similar frameworks. Hence, the idea of a neoextractivist trap should be understood in genuinely multidimensional terms, encompassing environmental, economic, cultural, political, social, geopolitical, and technological dimensions. This makes it clear that the very notion of a neoextractivist trap must be approached as an interdisciplinary and collaborative research proposal, oriented towards understanding the set of structural obstacles that hinder the path toward an ecological transition guided by the fight against inequalities.
This starting point is based on two fundamental diagnostic elements. First, the unprecedented implications for globally unequal relationships of diplomacy and trade posed by environmental emergency: leaving countries behind in the ecological transition means jeopardizing the transition at a planetary level. Furthermore, achieving a successful ecological transition—insofar as the adjective fits—will produce entirely new patterns of dependence, even if they are now shaped and limited by the environmental emergency. Understanding the trends that will shape post-neoliberal dependency currently requires understanding the legacy of neoliberal dependency in all its dimensions.
The second fundamental diagnostic element is that the current horizon for action in democratic countries consists of a sharp political division between a right wing that is not afraid to ally itself with the extreme right and a new progressivism. This real division—not mere “polarization”—is an integral part of the “trap” itself.
When it comes to acting and thinking in the emergency situation in which we find ourselves, we ignore these elements at the risk of militarizing conflicts, democratic backsliding, and rendering the ecological transition unfeasible. At the same time, we must reach beyond the trench warfare of the present, and not allow the lowered horizon of current politics to lower our theoretical horizon as well.
Redemocratization and neoliberalism in Brazil
Brazilian neoliberalism’s rise coincided with the country’s redemocratization process in the mid-1980s, after twenty-one years of military dictatorship. In 1985, when presidential power passed to a civilian coalition opposed to Brazil’s military dictatorship, it was progressivism that led the transition to democracy: an alliance of original sectors of the left with sectors of the democratic right—as well as defectors from authoritarianism willing to submit to progressive leadership.3 Together with the forces of a newly forming left—of which the Workers’ Party (PT), founded in 1980, was the central representative—the 1988 Constitution was created. In addition to establishing democratic institutions, the progressive alliance that led redemocratization established the fight against all types of inequality as its main priority—this is how the creation in 1990 of the Unified Health System (Sistema Único de Saúde, SUS), modeled on the British NHS, should be understood.
Faced with the hegemony of progressivism, all that remained for the right-wing heirs of the military dictatorship was to build a defensive trench. This is not to say that this defensive tactic did not achieve important victories, starting with the failure to hold the agents of the dictatorship accountable for their crimes. It is simply to emphasize that, in this first moment of redemocratization, the social and political base of the declining dictatorship did not have the strength to control and direct the process.
The turbulent political, social, and economic process of adapting to the neoliberal order took place simultaneously with a democratic transition away from a military dictatorship that had led to hyperinflation and unpayable levels of foreign debt. The coexistence of these two processes is visible in the text of the 1988 Constitution itself, marked by the traces of national developmentalism that prevailed over the prior half century, as well as the neoliberal modernization that was already underway across the region.
However, the political arrangement led by progressives was guided by a principle of addition, not confrontation. This was not only because of the systematic guideline of refraining from holding agents of the dictatorship accountable for their crimes, but especially because the fight against inequalities circumvented structural change in, for example, the taxation of income and assets. It was an arrangement that succeeded in making the poor, marginalized, and discriminated strata minimally favored, but under the guideline that the other strata would maintain the dominant positions they had won and preserved during the dictatorial period.
The government’s counterpart to the accommodating arrangement of redemocratization was a peculiar configuration of the political system. From 1994—in elections marked by the launch of the Real Plan for political and economic stabilization—until at least the re-election of Dilma Rousseff (2011–2016, PT) in 2014, the vast majority of parties formed a relatively indistinct mass of political machines: embedded in the state, they reproduced themselves in it, functioning like companies selling parliamentary support. With rare exceptions, all the parties have always been in government, whatever the government and whichever candidate they supported in the presidential election. What we had during this period was a model of political management based on the formation of super coalitions, limiting the nominal opposition to a parliamentary fringe. This was called coalition presidentialism.4 In conditions of growing party fragmentation, the administration of super coalitions tended to be inefficient when it came to implementing the government program that won the coalition the presidential election.5 At the same time, it served the accommodating political arrangement that kept the fight against inequalities and the deepening of democracy at a slow and controlled pace.
In the adjustment that controlled inflation carried out by the Real Plan, which began in 1993, the solution to this basic limitation of the non-confrontation strategy was the 2002 increase in the tax burden—at the end of eight years of Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s (PSDB) government—from a level of 25 percent to around 31.5 percent of GDP. The number grew by another two percentage points until 2006, under the Lula government (PT, 2003–2010), when the political system established that this would be the limit percentage. With minor variations, this is the tax burden that prevails to this day.6
Once the path of increasing the tax burden was closed, the governments led by the PT found in the commodities boom (2003–2011) a new way of tackling inequalities without challenging the accommodating arrangement of redemocratization.7 Over the last forty years, Brazil has experienced a structural change in the correlation of social, economic, and cultural forces. The globalization of the principle of “comparative advantages” has reinforced reprimarization and produced the deindustrialization of several economies in the global south—especially in Latin America—a process that has transformed the countries of the region into commodity-dependent countries.8 In the case of Brazil, agriculture and mineral extraction have taken up all the space lost by the manufacturing industry—to the point where some authors consider that manufacturing is “on the verge of extinction,” in terms of participation in GDP or productivity and exports.9
Despite the 2008 crisis, the strategy continued to operate until its complete exhaustion in the mid-2010s. That’s when a severe recession, which began at the end of 2014 but whose effects were only really felt in 2015, took hold and lasted two long years, until the end of 2016. Brazil’s GDP fell by 7.2 percent in the period, and GDP per capita by 9.1 percent, surpassing the figures of the 1930–1931 crisis in the country. Simultaneously, from 2015 to the beginning of 2019, an “anti-corruption” judicial operation—inspired by Italy’s Operation Clean Hands of the early 1990s—called Lava Jato, or Operation Car Wash, exposed the illicit practices in government, and installed a state of permanent panic in the political system. Following the brief period between Dilma Rousseff’s re-election in 2014 and her impeachment in 2016, ten years of intense crisis followed.10 In 2018, after more than thirty years of the least limited democracy the country has ever had, Brazil saw the return of an uninhibited far right that, by leaps and bounds, led a new social, political, and economic coalition that came to presidential power with Jair Bolsonaro. Since then, the right, unafraid to ally itself with the far right, has taken on the role of representing this new coalition, formed and consolidated over forty years of neoliberalism.11 This is the terrain on which the neo-extractivist trap is being set in the country today—and on which its future is being disputed.
The end of the accommodating arrangement of redemocratization was reflected in the country’s public budget. Today, 95 percent of the budget is committed to mandatory spending from the outset. Any government has only 5 percent of the budget to carry out the program it was elected to carry out. Since 2015, the National Congress has progressively grabbed a substantial part of that 5 percent of discretionary government use, reaching 20 percent of that total today (or 1 percent of the country’s entire federal budget). This is an outlier in international comparisons. The application of resources is highly nontransparent and inefficient, tending to reproduce the same dominant correlation of parliamentary forces in place since 2018. This change has profoundly affected the previous pattern of government, reducing the dominance of the executive branch.12 As a result, public investment in Brazil has reached historic lows in the last decade.
It is also worth noting that circumventing the difficulties of this arrangement through household indebtedness has been tried, and in this respect has also reached its strategic limits.13 It is also worth highlighting the effects of the internalization of public debt from the mid-2000s onwards. At this point, Brazil not only practically eliminated its dollar-denominated debt, but also accumulated reserves of around US$330 billion—protecting the country from currency crises like those of the 1990s. At the same time, in 2024, about 16 percent of all public spending went to debt service. The internalization of the debt has its political counterpart in making large holders of bonds decisive players in freezing the balance of forces, forming a bulwark for the anti-redistributive coalition in Brazil.
Consequently, there is no fiscal space to finance an ecological transition in the country, even in the limited form of a simple energy transition.14 Nor is there any prospect of attaining the necessary external funding.15 And this is despite the fact that it is hard to imagine a country better positioned in strategic terms to carry out this transition than Brazil: more than 80 percent of its energy system is renewable; it has the second largest area of forest in the world (particularly in the Amazon region); it has the largest renewable reserves of fresh water on the planet; it has enormous potential in terms of solar and wind power generation (which already account for almost a quarter of all electricity produced in the country); and it is rich in other natural resources that can be mobilized for the energy transition.16
End of the accommodating arrangement: neo-extractivism and redistributive disputes
Regardless of the outrageous social situation indexed by statistics on income concentration, inequality, discrimination, and poverty in Brazil, the new and fearless right has managed to construe even the limited pact of redemocratization as excessive and unacceptable. The implicit motto of this coalition is: Brazilian redistribution has gone too far. This is how the political division occurs in Brazil, but perhaps not only in Brazil—in terms of a division between a redistributivist coalition and an anti-redistributivist coalition.17
Yet both coalitions rely on the neo-extractivism inherited from the neoliberal period.18 The coalition of the right has no issue with the neoextractivist position, and however decisive Lula’s return to the presidency at the beginning of 2023 was, it does not represent a turn from neo-extractivism.19 The progressive coalition cannot abandon its position on neo-extractivism without risking elections, and if they are defeated, the opposition coalition will deepen extractivist patterns. At the same time, if progressivism doesn’t break from neo-extractivism, the far right’s preferred economic model for Brazil is already secure.
The example of oil exploration is all the more emblematic of this state of affairs in the case of Brazil, given its increasingly important role in the country’s economy.20 In 2016, Brazil became a net exporter of oil for the first time and, by 2024, the main producer in Latin America. In 2024, oil and its derivatives reached the top position in terms of total exported value. Petrobras, a state-owned company and the leading producer of crude oil in Brazil, “is planning such a rapid increase in oil production that it could become the world’s third largest producer by 2030,” and “already extracts almost as much crude oil per year as ExxonMobil.”21
The contradiction involved in this expansion project can be seen in the dispute within the government over oil exploration near the mouth of the Amazon River. In 2023, Petrobras released a study estimating that there were around 5.6 billion barrels of oil in the Equatorial Margin block, in the state of Amapá. However, the Brazilian environmental regulator, Ibama, denied Petrobras a license to begin any kind of exploration. The Minister for the Environment, Marina Silva, defended Ibama’s opinion and stressed that the agency’s technical point of view should not be subject to political interference. For their part, the Brazilian government, and even Lula, defend exploration and are moving toward its authorization.22
As there is no shortage of contradictions in a neo-extractivist trap, Petrobras is a leading firm responsible for technological innovation, substantial research and development, and technology transfer in Brazil.23 Petrobras has far surpassed the impressive achievements of the state-owned agricultural technology production company, Embrapa; its size prevents comparisons with the still very dynamic and competitive Brazilian aeronautics industry, represented by Embraer. Today, it is difficult to imagine a link between company and university that could compete with the one consolidated by Petrobras to lead an energy transition in the country.
The competitive electoral consolidation of the anti-redistributionist coalition in Brazil shows that the problem goes far beyond simple manipulation, disinformation, and violence. The victory of neoliberalism over previous forms of capitalist regulation was definitive: there is no going back to previous models of society. Much of this is due to the fact that neoliberalism has established deep social roots, making the political voluntarism necessary to restructure capitalist regulation illusory.24 The fearless new right fits comfortably with a neo-extractivist model, while the camp of the new progressivism, aware of the blatant contradictions in its own program, is forced to perpetuate this growth regime. It is in the dispute between the neo-extractivist coherence of the right and the contradictions of the new progressivism that the future of the country will be played out—a future that depends less and less on itself, as befits a dependent country.
This essay takes up, in part, developments present in the texts “A New Dependency Theory Moment” (The Ideas Letter, April 18, 2024), “Why It Is So Hard for Latin America to Move Away from Neoliberalism and Neoextractivism: The Case of Brazil” (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 31, 2024) and “O Centrão sem medo e a encruzilhada do PT” ( piauí magazine , no. 204, September 2023).
FootnotesSee in this regard my text “Peripheral Conditionalities,” published by PW on September 26, 2024.
An important overview of the collective effort in Latin America to develop the idea of “neoextractivism” can be found in Maristella Svampa’s Neo-extractivism in Latin America: Socio-environmental Conflicts, the Territorial Turn, and New Political Narratives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019).
An accurate reconstruction of these developments over the last 40 years can be found in Perry Anderson, Brazil Apart: 1964-2019, London: Verso, 2019.
This explanatory paradigm has always considered irrelevant the traits that I point out here as central: the formation of parliamentary and government super coalitions, and adherence to the government on duty, whatever it may be and whichever candidate the adhering party supported in the presidential election. On my alternative proposal for characterizing this model and other important points developed in this text, see Marcos Nobre, Imobilismo em movimento: da redemocratização ao governo Dilma, São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2013 and Limites da Democracia, work cited.
On party fragmentation between 1991 and 2019, see Andréa Freitas and Glauco Peres da Silva, “Das manifestações de 2013 à eleição de 2018 no Brasil: Buscando uma abordagem institucional”, Novos Estudos Cebrap, v. 38, n. 1, jan.-abr. 2019.
Manoel Pires, “Gross tax burden: 1990-2023,” May 13, 2024, Fiscal Policy Observatory, IBRE/FGV. Approved in stages between 2023 and 2024, a wide-ranging Tax Reform will be implemented from 2026 onwards, becoming fully effective from 2033. It is still difficult to say precisely what the tax burden will be as a result of this far-reaching change.
For an analysis of the impacts of the commodities boom and its exhaustion on the Brazilian economic model, see Laura Carvalho, Valsa Brasileira: do boom ao caos econômico, São Paulo: Todavia, 2018.
According to UNCTAD’s criteria, 17 Latin American countries would fall into this category, including Brazil. In the case of Brazil, “the share of commodity exports increased from 44.3 per cent in 1998-2002 to 62.8 per cent in 2013-2017. While all commodity groups increased their share in total merchandise exports, agricultural exports grew the most, by 390 per cent and accounted for 42.8 per cent of the increase in export value during the period. And even though non-commodity exports grew by 160 per cent, their share in total exports fell, accounting for 29.1 per cent of the growth of exports” (Commodity-Dependence: A Twenty-Year Perspective, UNCTAD, 2019, p. 28). A retrospective analysis that covers the entire 20th century and reaches its negative effects up to the present day can be found in José Antonio Ocampo, “Commodity-led Development in Latin America” (in: Gilles Carbonnier; Humberto Campodónico; Sergio Tezanos Vásquez (eds.), Alternative Pathways to Sustainable Development: Lessons From Latin America, Brill Nijhoff: Leiden/Boston, 2027. This is merely an indication of the much broader and more fundamental task of presenting the structural transformation of the Brazilian economy during the neoliberal period. It should also be pointed out that this is just one of the many dimensions of Brazil’s position as a country “in a neo-extractivist trap”, as I have tried to indicate throughout this text.
The share of the manufacturing industry in Brazil’s GDP reached 35.8% in 1985, fell to 13.8 percent in 1998 and dropped to 11.3 percent in 2021, while its share of exports fell from a level close to 80 percent in 1997 to around 50 percent, these percentage points having been taken by agriculture (8.1 p.p.) and mineral extraction (19.7 p.p.). (Claudio Considera and Juliana Trece, “On the verge of extinction”, discussion paper #6, IBRE/FGV, October 7, 2022). This is a mere observation and not a proposal for “reindustrialization” to return to a previous moment or something similar. Because the problem with a country like Brazil is rather the neo-extractivist trap it finds itself in. It is a political, economic, social and cultural trap. So it’s not a question of “re-industrialization”, but rather of determining which industrial policies are necessary and appropriate to get out of the neo-extractivist trap. On this subject, see the report by Adriana Mandacaru Guerra, Tim Sahay, Renato H. de Gaspi and Bentley Allan, “New industrial policy for a new world: seizing Brazil’s opportunities in the energy transition”, February 2025.
The Gini coefficient can give an idea of inequality and poverty in Brazil in the 2000s and 2010s: “The first decade of the 21st century was the best the country has ever experienced in distributive terms. Between 2001 and 2011, average household income grew by more than 30 percent, inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient fell by more than 10 percent, and the extreme poverty and poverty rates fell by 4 and 12 percentage points respectively” (Rogério J. Barbosa; Pedro H. G. Ferreira de Souza; Sergei S. D. Soares, ‘Income inequality in Brazil from 2012 to 2019’, Dados, July 16, 2020). This process was reversed in the second half of the 2010s.
An attempt to reconstruct the formation process of this coalition can be found in Limits of Democracy. In this book, I also try to show that an important basis for the mobilization and engagement of this coalition lies in a non-institutionalized organization that I call the Bolsonaro digital party. The relationship between this organization and formal, institutionalized parties, with all its tensions and conflicts, is actually one of the strengths of the Bolsonaro coalition. On the digitalization of politics since the mid-2000s, see also Limits of Democracy.
Raul Bonfim; Joyce Hellen Luz; Vitor Vasquez, “Mandatory Individual Amendments: a Change in the Pattern of Executive Dominance in the Brazilian Budgetary and Financial Cycle”, Brazilian Political Science Review, 17 (2), 2023.
Lena Lavinas, Eliane Araújo, and Pedro Rubin, “Income transfers and household debt. The advancing collateralization of social policy in the midst of restructuring crises” (Revista de Economia Política, 44 (2), 2024), show that household debt in relation to income practically tripled between 2005 and 2020, rising from a level of 20 percent to close to 60 percent.
Given this state of affairs, it’s not surprising that proposals have emerged to “flexibilize” the budget, i.e. abandon compulsory spending on health, education and social benefits linked to the welfare system, for example. This is a proposal that is consistent with the Bolsonaro coalition’s anti-redistributive stance, in addition to the (little) that has been achieved since the beginning of redemocratization. But the correlation of forces is so restrictive that the proposal still finds an echo in relevant sectors of the new progressivism coalition.
In the aforementioned Valsa Brasileira, Laura Carvalho uses the ironic figure of the “confidence fairy”, created by Paul Krugman in 2017, to remind us that austerity policies have not produced the promised rewards in terms of private sector investment and spending.
As shown in the aforementioned report by Adriana Mandacaru Guerra, Tim Sahay, Renato H. de Gaspi and Bentley Allan, “New industrial policy for a new world: seizing Brazil’s opportunities in the energy transition”: “In the new geopolitical scenario, the most relevant countries will be those with great potential for solar and wind energy, critical mineral reserves, biomass resources, and hydrogen production capacity. Brazil’s size and wealth of natural resources give it the potential to become a leading resource power. Add to this its capabilities in advanced manufacturing and mechanized agriculture, and Brazil can be a first-rate power in the new world energy system, alongside China, the United States and Russia.”
One of the main tasks when it comes to identifying patterns of dependency is to circumscribe as clearly as possible these blocs and coalitions at the national-peripheral level in their internal connections with central societies. Within the limits of this text and this proposal, the most I can do is state the question and try to indicate what I consider to be some of the structuring elements for formulating research hypotheses. A first overview of what specifically concerns foreign investment can be obtained by consulting the graphs compiled in “Governo desenha janela para atrair investimentos estrangeiros diretos”, Folha de S. Paulo, January 11, 2025 . This table should only be understood in terms of a first illustrative approximation of the argument. It is essential to carry out detailed studies on the evolution of foreign direct investment in Brazil according to the share by host country of the final controller and relate it to exports and the trade flow in order to achieve a comprehensive starting point. And this not only applies to trade between the Global North and South, but also to South-South trade, which also has its own specific dependency chains.
Each in their own way, both representatives of the current divide are legitimate heirs to neoliberalism. The terms in which Gary Gerstle (The Rise and Fall of the Neoliberal Order: America and the World in the Free Market Era, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022) described the configuration of the dispute in the United States clarify the details of the succession process: one side is heir to “neo-Victorianism” (the conservative neoliberalism of Ronald Reagan in the 1980s), the other is heir to “cosmopolitanism” (the progressive neoliberalism consolidated since Bill Clinton’s administration in the 1990s). The difference in the new generation of the divide is that in many places the fearless right, heir to neo-Victorianism, is now explicitly controlled by the extreme right. The new progressivism, for its part, formerly the establishment itself in many of the countries that are still democratic, is still searching for a new configuration in view of the new hegemony of the fearless right.
Synthesizing a collective effort in Latin America to develop the notion of “neo-extractivism”, Maristella Svampa (Neo-extractivism in Latin America. Socio-environmental Conflicts, the Territorial Turn, and New Political Narratives, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019) summarizes this state of affairs in the formulas “neo-extractivism” and “progressive neo-extractivism.”
Another emblematic example here is agriculture. On this, see Fernando Rugitsky’s article, “The corral of the world: agribusiness and ecological transition in Brazil”, Phenomenal World, August 21, 2024, which also explores other aspects of the contradictions of the new progressive coalition in power in the country. For a complex anthropological-political understanding of the “world of agribusiness”, see Caio Pompeia, Formação política do agronegócio, São Paulo: Elefante, 2021.
M. Bearak, “Brazil’s Clashing Goals: Protect the Amazon and Pump Lots More Oil”, The New York Times, March 13, 2024.
As Cibele Vieira said in an interview with Hugo Fanton: “The Guianas are already exploring around the Equatorial Margin. The dispute with Venezuela is related to this. In today’s world, giving up fossil fuels is not yet a viable option. The Equatorial Margin will be explored, either by Brazil or by another country. Our understanding is that new frontiers have to be explored, in this conception that the gains should be invested in the energy transition,” Phenomenal World, March 7, 2024. In a similar vein, see César Loza’s interview with Camilo Andrés Garzón, Phenomenal World, September 18, 2024. The Colombian case is all the more interesting because the results of Gustavo Petro’s government’s decision not to sign new gas and oil exploration agreements will most likely be paradigmatic for thinking about the logic of the neo-extractivist trap, given Colombia’s dependence on this commodity. On this subject, see once again Phenomenal World, which published Salomón Kalmanovitz’s interview with Camilo Andrés Garzón on August 1, 2024.
“For the third consecutive year, Petrobras has broken the record for filing patents, with 142 applications registered with the National Institute of Industrial Property (INPI), surpassing the marks obtained in the last two years (…). The company also surpassed the mark of 1,200 active patents, maintaining its leadership among national applicants, including companies and universities, and is awaiting confirmation from the INPI as to whether it has achieved the national record. The company’s strategic plan, released recently, foresees investments of US$3.6 billion in research, development and innovation (R&DI), from 2024 to 2028, the largest in the company’s history, with an expected increase in investments in decarbonization and new energies of around 30% in 2028.” “Petrobras breaks patent filing record in 2023”, Agência Fapesp, January 16, 2024.
I’m thinking here of works such as those by Camila Rocha (Less Marx, more Mises: Liberalism and the New Right in Brazil, São Paulo: Todavia, 2021), Rosana Pinheiro-Machado (“The Right to Shine: Poverty, Consumption and (De) Politicization in Neoliberal Brazil,” Journal of Consumer Culture 23, no. 2 (April 22, 2022): 312–30, https://doi.org/10.1177/14695405221086066), Angela Nagle (Kill All Normies: Online Culture Wars From 4Chan And Tumblr To Trump And The Alt-Right, Winchester, UK: Zero Books, 2017), Verónica Gago (La razón neoliberal: Economías barrocas y pragmática popular, Madrid: Traficantes de Sueños, 2015), Carlos Alba Vega; Gustavo Lins Ribeiro; Gordon Mathews (eds, La globalización desde abajo, la otra economía mundial, Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica/El Colegio de México, 2015), as well as the aforementioned book by Arlie R. Hochschild (Strangers in their Own Land: Anger and Mourning on the American Right, N. York: The New Press, 2016).
Filed Under
